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1. Territorial benchmarking in the European Union 
 
At the moment, regional innovation policy is at the top of the EU agenda. Broadly speaking, regional 
policy – of which regional innovation policy is an important part – is directed at solving the problems of 
uneven development between territories in the EU, including regions, localities and cities. Nowadays, 
over one third of the budget of the European Communities is allocated to this field. For the 2000-2006 
period 213 billion euros have been reserved for transfer to Europe’s regions (EC, 2001). A large part 
of this amount, 195 billion euros, is spent by the four Structural Funds, while the rest, 18 billion, is 
allocated to the Cohesion Fund. 94% of the Structural Funds goes to so-called ‘Objective’ regions: 
Objective 1-regions (areas whose development is lagging behind), Objective 2-regions (industrial, 
rural, urban or coastal areas that face difficulties in socio-economic restructuring) and Objective 3-
regions (areas where people face difficulties in the labour market). To improve the situation of these 
three categories of ‘less-favoured’ regions, the European Commission finances multi-annual regional 
development programmes with four funding instruments: the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and 
the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF-
Guidance). The Structural Funds are not restricted to support for these priority areas though; 6% of the 
budget is dedicated to four Community Initiatives meant to seek common solutions to problems that 
affect the whole Union. These funds are financing projects aimed at promoting interregional 
cooperation (Interreg III), regenerating cities and urban areas in decline (Urban II), developing rural 
areas through local initiatives (Leader+) and combating inequalities and discrimination in access to the 
labour market (Equal). Next to the Structural Funds there is a special fund to assist Spain, Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal. This is the Cohesion Fund that finances major projects in the field of 
environment and transport. Finally, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC’s) that 
recently entered the EU received special assistance in the form of pre-accession aid over the last 
years, including funds such as PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA. 
It is within this complex structure of EU policy objectives and funds that national and local 
authorities have to find their way and should try to get their own regional policies co-financed and 
pursued. It must be said, however, that the European Commission realizes that the successful 
implementation of regional policy ultimately depends upon close cooperation between European, 
national and sub-national levels. After all, only in this way formidable information problems on the 
situation ‘on the spot’ in the European regions can be overcome. Therefore, the EC adheres to the 
‘partnership principle’, requiring coordination between the European funds and the instruments used 
by national and local bodies (Vanhove, 1999). According to this principle, Member States wishing to 
be considered for EU-funding should present proposals that fit within the broad policy guidelines set 
by the European Commission. Among the ‘strategic suggestions’ the Commission does in this respect, 
the most important one is that these proposals should focus on improving ‘regional competitiveness’ 
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(European Commission, 2001). Whether or not this concept makes sense for a region – as opposed to 
a company – has been heavily debated (cf. e.g. Reinert (1995) and Krugman (1996)). Without going 
into this debate, we want to highlight that ‘regional competitiveness’ is a relative concept, implying the 
need to compare with others. This is exactly what the European Commission wants (sub-)national 
governments to do: to benchmark themselves with other regions, to take example from so-called ‘best 
practices’ and to learn from them. The dissemination of these best practices is promoted by means of 
all kinds of score boards, case studies of successful regions and interregional benchmarks.  
  European authorities propagate this method of territorial benchmarking as a new open means of 
coordination of regional policies with the underlying idea that it will result in European-wide 
convergence in incomes and living standards (Getimis, 2003). Borrowing successful policies is seen 
as a means to speed up regional development or achieve it at lower cost. Accordingly, to foster 
regional competitiveness, policy makers increasingly base their policy efforts on interregional-
comparisons and thus what worked somewhere else. In practice, this EU-driven trend of territorial 
benchmarking mostly leads to the set-up of regional policies with similar objectives, policy concepts 
and instruments (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000). Everywhere in Europe regions claim to aim for 
‘competitive advantage’ by creating ‘framework conditions’ for the formation of ‘high-tech clusters’ and 
‘innovation systems’. Thus, the authorities hope to turn their area into a ‘learning region’ that rivals the 
success of ‘Silicon Valley’. Among the test bench regions authorities look for, this California high-tech 
hub has reached the status of one of the most successful ‘best practice’ regions in the world. The area 
was the birthplace of the computer and its semiconductor cluster has been leading in the development 
of many applications of modern information technology. All over Europe it is tried to create such 
‘Silicon Somewheres’ (Florida, 2002). Some areas even frankly admit it that they want to become the 
next Silicon Valley, as they brand themselves as Silicon Glen (Scotland (UK)), Language Valley 
(Flanders (B)), Silicon Saxony (Eastern-Germany (D)), Dommel Valley (Eindhoven (NL)) and Silicon 
Seaside (Steinkjer (N)). Besides Silicon Valley popular European examples of ‘best practice’ regions 
are Emilia-Romagna (I), Baden-Württemberg (D), Sophia Antipolis (F) and the Öresund (DK/S). 
Inspired by such regional ‘laboratories of modernity’ governments at all scale levels tend to focus on 
high-tech activities in their attempts to raise regional competitiveness. In short, the particular set-up of 
today’s European regional policy leads to attempts of regions across the continent to turn themselves 
into the next ‘Silicon Somewhere’.  
The aim of this paper is to assess the usefulness of territorial benchmarking in EU regional 
innovation policy and to find out what lessons can be drawn from regional success stories. For this 
purpose, we combine insights from three bodies of knowledge: Schumpeterian theory, economic 
geography and comparative public policy studies. First, we will show that the work of Schumpeter, an 
author who is mostly cited by governments in justifying their regional innovation policies, is not only 
relevant in matters of innovation: his theory also can be used to explain the copycat behavior among 
authorities in a political context (section 2). Then, we briefly list the factors that are generally seen in 
the economic-geographical literature as the determinants of regional competitiveness (section 3). After 
that, insights from comparative public policy are used to identify the ‘contingencies of lesson-drawing’, 
i.e. the preconditions that affect whether a policy measure can be transferred from one place to 
another (section 4). Section 5 concludes and provides recommendations for EU regional innovation 
policy.  
 
 
2. Territorial benchmarking and Schumpeterian theory 
 
In general, governments use scientific insights only when they can help them in achieving political 
aims. This applies for regional policy as well. Especially since the 1990s the traditional efficiency and 
equity arguments for EU regional policy – see e.g. Martin (1999) and Vanhove (1999) for a concise 
overview – have been criticized and supplemented with policy rationales derived from the literature on 
(regional) innovation systems (Lundvall, 1992; Cooke et al., 1998). In this perspective, the 
geographically concentrated development of new products and processes (innovations) is seen as the 
engine behind regional economic growth. Regional innovation is regarded as a cumulative learning 
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process whose success depends upon the close cooperation between private and public 
organizations. Together these market- and non-market parties make up a regional system of 
innovation. If there are mismatches between its constituting parts (e.g. lack of cooperation between 
firms and universities), it is argued, the innovation system performs below its potential and regional 
policy may be needed to correct these so-called ‘system failures’. Especially in the 1990s this systemic 
view has become popular both in the literature and in policy circles (see e.g. Edquist, 1997 and OECD, 
1999). In nearly all recent papers and policy documents on regional innovation systems, reference is 
made to the work of the famous economist Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950). Due to his path-
breaking work on innovation-led economic development he is often cited as the ‘champion of the 
economics of innovation’ (Hospers, 2003a).  
 Why is the work of Schumpeter embraced so widely in today’s regional science and policy? After 
all, Schumpeter’s main message that new products and processes drive economic development may 
sound trivial. For static neoclassical theory on which economic policies traditionally are based, 
however, this insight is new. In contrast to neoclassical economists, Schumpeter sees economic life as 
an ‘evolutionary process’. According to Schumpeter, the main force that brings about this change is 
the ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942). This process refers to the waves of 
innovative activity that hit the economic system in different points of time, resulting in the destruction of 
the old economic structure and the creation of a new one. Thus, in The Theory of Economic 
Development (1912) Schumpeter sees the introduction of innovations, that is ‘the carrying out of new 
combinations’ as the key process of economic change. Innovations do not just occur, but always have 
their basis in the pre-existing economic structure. The force that induces the system to drift is 
entrepreneurial innovation, asking for acts of entrepreneurship, i.e. heroic efforts of ‘new men’ to break 
the circular flow of existing activity. As an entrepreneur innovates rather than invents, he is a ‘first 
mover’, a position rendering him temporary monopoly power with associated huge monopoly profits. In 
turn, the profits the entrepreneur makes attract imitators. This tendency of economic actors to imitate 
successful entrepreneurs also explains the wave-like movements of innovative activity in ‘competitive 
capitalism’, Schumpeter argues. Since the appearance of a risk-loving entrepreneur creates a 
favourable climate for others who are less venturesome, an upswing in economic development occurs. 
But not forever: as the chances for making profits are eroded by imitation of the original innovation, an 
economic boom is followed by a downswing. In other words, innovations tend to appear and disappear 
in ‘swarms’ or ‘clusters’. The length of the cycles of innovative activity depends upon the degree of 
creative destruction the innovations in question induce. Making use of a mass of historical material 
Schumpeter shows in his Business Cycles (1939) the existence of three types of cycles in ‘competitive 
capitalism’: the three year Kitchin cycle (inventory (de)accumulation), the Juglar cycle lasting 8-11 
years (individual innovations such as the dynamo) and the 50-60 year Kondratieff cycle (major 
innovations such as the railroad). In short, in the Schumpeterian vision economic ups and downs just 
represent processes of adaptation of the capitalist engine to new circumstances.  
To understand capitalism, studying economic theory and economic history do not suffice, 
Schumpeter asserts. Notably in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) he shows that complex 
interactions between economic change and the economy’s institutional framework. Schumpeter (1942) 
argues that institutions tend to persist after they have lost their rationale. Institutional change is difficult 
and may slow down the process of economic change. However, to Schumpeter, there is no one-way 
causality between institutions and economic processes; the reverse is also true. The political process 
and democracy are cases in point as they are institutions mainly shaped by economic processes. 
Schumpeter states that politicians can be best conceptualized as ‘political entrepreneurs’ that do not 
strive for the common good, but rather aim to govern the masses. Seen from this economic 
perspective, ‘the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote’ (Schumpeter, 1942). For the purposes of our research this insight on the parallels between 
economic and political life is more important than Schumpeter’s emphasis on the importance of 
innovation for economic development. In our view, it is exactly this analogy that may explain the trend 
among policy makers to create the next Silicon Somewhere. If we accept Schumpeter’s statement that 
politics is business politicians may be seen as taking part in a competitive struggle with the people’s 
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vote as the profitable result. Political entrepreneurs search for ‘policy innovations’, i.e. successful 
policies meeting the interests of groups in society, with the ultimate aim to win the political game. 
Thus, business men trade in goods, politicians in votes. At this point, Schumpeter stopped his 
analogy. However, we want to draw the parallel further and argue for the existence of swarms of 
innovative activity in the political sphere as well. In this line of reasoning, the trend of public authorities 
to copy ‘best practices’ is a political variant of the tendency among economic actors to imitate 
innovations of successful entrepreneurs. Applied in the case of regional policy this means the 
following: the favourable climate created by the appearance of a ‘first mover’ (say, Silicon Valley) 
evokes an upswing of reactions by other regions who are less creative and venturesome. By imitating 
the original ‘policy innovation’, they hope to share in the profits – and for some time they can. But as 
the pie has to be shared among more and more imitators, the chances to make profits from adopting 
the success story erode. At some point, there will be an overcapacity of regions burdened with the 
same activity and a shake-out sets in, while politicians, hoping to turn the tide, search for new ‘best 
practices’ (say, the Öresund) to be followed.  
 Thus, from a Schumpeterian view, by relying too much on innovative ‘best practices’, regions 
ultimately undermine their potential competitiveness. To be sure, competition is only possible if there 
are at least some similarities between rivalling regions. But which region will win this territorial 
competition and gain the prize in terms of extra economic activity, jobs and income, ultimately 
depends upon the degree in which regions are able to make the difference. When it comes to real 
regional competitive advantage, it is about trying to be different, not from doing the same things other 
regions do (Nooteboom, 1999; Hospers, 2001). Conversely, by giving themselves profiles such as 
‘Silicon’ or ‘Valley’, European regions do not make it clear how they differ from one another. Moreover, 
by mirroring themselves with Silicon Valley, they recognize the superior position of this area and its 
‘first mover advantage’; thus, they contribute to the entrepreneur’s reputation as a success story. Next, 
from a (supra)-national perspective, the bandwagon effect in regional policy involves the risk of 
excessive investment (duplication) in the same economic activities, with information technology as 
today’s most prominent example. What might happen here in the field of regions, is illustrated well by 
the development of the European airline industry at the moment. In fact, the wish of each country to 
have its own airline company (‘national champion’) has led to overcapacity in the airline market on a 
European scale – with the sector’s decline and a Schumpeterian competitive destruction process and 
shake out as the inevitable result. 
 
 
3.  Territorial benchmarking and economic-geography 
 
Building on the pioneering work of Marshall (1890) prominent writers such as Krugman and Porter 
have tried to explain the strong tendency of economic activities to concentrate in space. Their work 
has been influential both in regional science and policy making since the 1990s. Krugman (1990) has 
developed models in the field of ‘new economic geography’ that regard large-scale firms with 
increasing returns to scale as a source of clustering at a particular location. In this view, regional 
clustering is usually seen as a ‘good thing’ as it attracts new firms that want to profit from specialized 
labour, specialized intermediate inputs and knowledge spillovers. Once established, however, the 
initial clustering inevitably follows a place-specific path in time that may become quite rigid (‘locked-
in’). Thus, this ‘path dependency’ may induce spatial lock-in effects that paralyse entrepreneurship and 
innovation. The role such a spatial concentration process can play in an area’s competitiveness is 
analyzed by the business economist Porter (1990). The central concept in his analysis of competitive 
advantage is a ‘cluster’, i.e. ‘a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and 
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities’ (Porter, 
1998, p. 199). In his view, (regional) clusters boost an area’s competitive advantage for at least three 
reasons. First, participating in a cluster allows firms to operate more productively. They have a better 
access to means needed for carrying out their activities (such as technology, information, inputs, 
customers and channels) than they would have when operating in isolation. Second, this easier 
access will not only enhance the participants’ productivity, but also their ability to innovate. Third, an 
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existing cluster may provide a sound base for new business formation, as its relationships and 
institutions will confront entrepreneurs with lower barriers of entry than they will meet elsewhere.  
Even more than economists, geographers highlight the importance of unique local conditions to 
explain clustering of economic activity. Revitalizing a concept originally introduced by Marshall (1890) 
in particular Italian scholars have put forward the notion of ‘industrial districts’ since the mid-1980s 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; Belussi, 1996). In explaining agglomerations of regional industry, they argue, 
not only technology-related input-output relations should be taken into account. The local institutional 
structure is important as well. To support their point, industrial district scholars often refer to the 
successful economic development of Northern-Italy. In ‘industrial districts’ in Emilia-Romagna, for 
example, close inter-personal interaction and cooperation on a local scale are said to have created 
‘factories without walls’ and an ‘industrial atmosphere’. This local collective orientation has led to high 
growth rates in such artisan sectors as clothing, leather and ceramics. More recently, the concept of 
‘innovative milieux’ has come to the fore (Maillat, 1995; Malmberg et al., 1996). This concept can be 
regarded as the French variant of the Italian notion on industrial districts. Innovative milieux are 
‘islands of innovation’ in which local actors such as firms and (semi)public bodies have learned to 
combine their material and immaterial resources to bring about new products and services. Thus, 
innovation is seen as the result of a collective learning process within the spatial borders of the milieu. 
An often-cited example of an innovative milieu is the Swiss watch industry in the Jura d’Arc. The 
centuries-old networks in this area have facilitated collective learning in watch making and the 
development of new types of watches (e.g. Swatch). Innovation and learning are also central notions 
in the work on regional innovation systems and learning regions (Florida, 1995; Cooke, 2002). This 
strand of the literature regards innovation as a cumulative and interactive learning process and argues 
that innovating firms profit from complementary private and public parties (e.g. universities) in their 
neighbourhood. Close proximity may not only lower transport costs, but also facilitate trust and mutual 
learning und thus innovation. Together, the web of relations between innovating parties constitutes a 
‘regional system of innovation’ that – if functioning properly – may grow into a ‘learning region’ 
(Boekema et al., 2000).  
 By way of illustration, let us briefly examine the economic geography of three popular ‘best 
practices’ (Silicon-Valley, Emilia-Romagna and Baden-Württemberg) whose success has been 
explained by the theoretical ideas and concepts we reviewed above (Sternberg, 1996; Boekema et al., 
2000; Cooke, 2002). Perhaps the most famous example of regional clustering is Silicon Valley in the 
heart of California’s Santa Clara Country. In this micro-electronics-based region, firms jointly develop 
and produce semiconductors and computer chips that are sold world-wide. In particular the innovative 
attitude of the many immigrant entrepreneurs in the region has led to a fruitful combination of 
competition and cooperation, a factor that is mostly held responsible for Silicon Valley’s strong 
economic performance (Saxenian, 1994). The same is true for the already mentioned Italian example 
of a best practice, that of Emilia-Romagna. This region is located in the northern part of Italy (‘Third 
Italy’) and hosts clusters producing machine tools, ceramic tiles, knitting and footwear. Regularly, the 
fact that Emilia-Romagna has developed to one of the richest areas in Europe is associated with the 
local tradition of cooperation and collective action. This unique cooperative culture dates back to the 
Renaissance and has rendered the region high levels of social capital (Putnam et al., 1993). 
Moreover, the local government in Emilia-Romagna has supported the development of local clusters 
by providing social and business services, so-called ‘real services’. Besides Emilia-Romagna the 
German region of Baden-Württemberg is widely seen as one of the biggest industrial success stories 
within Europe over the past 30 years (Hassink, 1997). The region’s success is based on the presence 
of a strong engineering cluster dating back to a pre-industrial tradition in crafts and a strong regional 
pride among the inhabitants and their political representatives. Since the 1980s the christian-
democratic federal Land-government, represented by the directly elected former minister-president 
Lothar Späth, has been entrepreneurial and pro-active in promoting cooperation between ‘state, 
industry and science’. Thus, a lot of state-sponsored programmes could be designed to help market 
parties in the process of clustering, such as a technology transfer system known as the Steinbeis 
Stiftung. If anything, the success of these three regional best practices point to the importance on 
historically-grown local specificities, both in economic and institutional terms.  
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 All and all, economic geographers remind us that the adoption of ‘best practices’ may be tricky due 
to interregional differences in starting-position, economic structure and institutional particularities. 
Besides the fact that success stories may be overstated by the representatives of the donor region, it 
is often unclear what exactly has made the region to be seen as a successful one. That success may 
have to do with simple chance events (path dependency) or the unique structure or culture of the 
region in question. The contribution of these locality-specific factors in regional success is often 
overlooked. Thus, in trying to copy a regional test bench, regions often ignore the question whether 
they dispose of similar favourable preconditions. If these conditions are largely absent and the 
differences between the donor and host area are large, policy borrowing may be a naive and wasteful 
effort. Akademgorodok in Russia provides an extreme example of policy failure in this field (Castells 
and Hall, 1994). After the model of Silicon Valley this Siberian ‘city of science’ was built ‘ex nihilo’ in 
the 1950s. Since then, the place has been languishing for decades. The obvious lesson to be learnt 
from such ‘great planning disasters’ is that regional success cannot be produced from scratch. The 
need to care for the compatibility of a policy transplantation from ‘donor regions’ to ‘host regions’ also 
appears from the cases of the Italian island of Sardinia and the Ruhr Area in Germany’s west 
(Hospers, 2003b; Hospers, 2004). In both regions, the large-scale re-industrialization initiatives of 
government during the 1960s were simply rejected by the local environment. Both the industrial 
complexes in Sardinia and the high-tech sectors in the Ruhr Area turned out to be disembedded and 
consequently ended as ‘cathedrals in the desert’. 
 
 
4. Territorial benchmarking and comparative public policy studies 
 
Apart from Schumpeterian theory and economic geography, we think, also the literature on 
comparative public policy may be relevant to assess the usefulness of best practices in regional policy. 
One of the leading texts in this branch of policy studies defines comparative public policy as ‘the study 
of how, why, and to what effect different governments pursue particular courses of action and inaction’ 
(Heidenheimer et al., 1990, p. 3). Broadly, the goal of such a comparative approach is to find 
similarities and differences in policies between countries. Studying public policy comparatively may 
have several advantages (Heidenheimer et al., 1990; Hague et al., 1998). First, comparative research 
can be a helpful tool for drawing lessons for policy makers. Second, comparing public policies may be 
useful to find out how government institutions and political processes operate. Third, by studying policy 
strategies in other countries problems that are not bound to national borders (e.g. environmental 
problems) may be solved more easily. In other words, through comparing, policy makers may broaden 
their understanding of a current situation as well as of the constraints and options they face. Basically, 
these advantages hold for the study of regional ‘best practices’ as well. However, it can be argued that 
the possibility of learning by looking abroad (‘learning-by-comparing’) is always a matter of degree. In 
his famous book Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy (1993) Rose identifies seven so-called ‘contingent’ 
influences on lesson-drawing. These contingencies can be seen as preconditions that affect whether a 
policy initiative can be transferred from one place to another. In general, the fewer conditions are 
fulfilled, the more difficult it may be for policy makers to learn from policies pursued by governments in 
other areas. Rose (1993) lists the following contingences of lesson-drawing in public policy: 
 
 (1) Uniqueness. The policy does not address a unique problem. 
 (2) Resources. There are sufficient resources (money, public personnel, laws) available. 
(3) Institutions. The delivery of the programme is not dependent on unusual institutions. 
 (4) Complexity. The policy initiative is not too complex. 
 (5) Scale of change. The scale of change the policy implies is small. 
 (6) Interdependency. The programmes are interdependent in some way. 
 (7) Values. The policy is consistent with the values of policy makers. 
 
The likelihood that all these seven conditions are met highly depends upon the characteristics of the 
respective policy action authorities want to learn from (Rose, 1993). To make things manageable for 
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our purposes, we think it is useful to reformulate these contingencies to three groups of conditions that 
jointly determine to what extent policy makers can learn from experiences elsewhere. These re-
grouped ‘contingencies’ may be listed as follows:   
 
(A) Necessary contingencies. These are the conditions that must be fulfilled if policy makers want 
to draw any lessons from a policy initiative at all. In our view, they contain the contingencies of 
uniqueness, resources and interdependency. Firstly, the fewer the elements of uniqueness a 
policy initiative has, the more transferable it is. Secondly, governments have to dispose of 
sufficient resources in order to adopt a policy that worked somewhere else. The greater the 
equivalence of these resources between locations, the more fungible an initiative is. Thirdly, 
the areas compared have to be interdependent in some way. The greater the 
interdependency between these territories, the more likely it is that lessons can be drawn.  
(B) Structure-based contingencies. They refer to Rose’s contingencies of complexity and scale of 
change. The condition of complexity indicates that the policy initiative should not be too 
complex. The clearer its cause-and-effect structure, the more transferable it is. Moreover, the 
scale of change the policy implies in an area has to be relatively small to be fungible. The 
smaller the scale of change the adoption of a programme involves, the more likely it is that 
policy makers can learn from it. 
(C) Culture-based contingencies. These factors encompass Rose’s contingencies of values and 
institutions. Both refer to the cultural characteristics of an area, like its norms, conventions, 
customs, degree of trust and political ideology. These soft factors make up the institutional 
tissue of an area. In general, to learn from a policy initiative, it must not depend on unusual 
institutions or values. The more similar the institutions and values in the areas compared, the 
more fungible a policy action is.  
 
Relating these three groups of contingencies to regional policy in Europe yields the following results. 
Generally speaking, the necessary (but still insufficient) conditions are likely to be fulfilled. To start, 
regional policy programmes are not one of a kind, as they have become pervasive at all levels of 
government. Next, most European regions wishing to learn from success stories are advanced: 
usually, they are wealthy, employ qualified civil servants and have a continental or common law 
system. Thus, they are likely to have similar resources as popular ‘benchmark’ regions like Silicon 
Valley and Baden-Württemberg. Furthermore, the trend of globalisation has created interdependency 
between regional policies, which has increased cross-region learning. The emergence of Structural 
and Cohesion Funds has made regional policy to a common concern in all regions across the EU. This 
interdependency can be observed too when hearing politicians speaking about the need to ‘match’ 
policy efforts of other governments (Jacobs and De Man, 1996). Thus, we expect that the first group of 
contingencies of lesson-drawing will be met in the case of regional policy.  
 The likelihood that the other conditions are fulfilled in the case of benchmarks of regional policy is 
still rather questionable though. As a matter of fact, in line with the economic-geographical literature 
the comparative public policy approach argues that the success of ‘best practices’ often can be related 
to place-specific factors (section 3). Translating this argument in terms of Rose’s contingencies, we 
fear that regional success stories (e.g. Silicon Valley and Emilia-Romagna) are often so much based 
on structure- and culture-based contingencies that transferring policies from these regions to other 
places is at best difficult. Mostly, regional success is the result of a complex interplay of factors that 
are hard to isolate or even to identify. Policy action is only one of the possible determinants of the 
performance of an area. Moreover, regional policy programmes are complex in that they do not have a 
simple cause-and-effect structure. As such they differ from, say, a speed limit that can be monitored 
and enforced by the state directly. The goals of regional policy are vague, while its effects are diffuse 
and hard to measure empirically. Besides, the scale of structural change needed for an area to be 
able to profit from a foreign success story may be too large. Copying a successful policy, such as the 
provision of real services in Emilia-Romagna or a pro-active approach of the autonomous government 
in Baden-Württemberg, may require a new way of thinking of government officials and ask for radical 
administrative changes. When turning to the culture based contingencies, we note that successful 
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policy initiatives often are based on the unique, historically-grown cultural climate and political ideology 
of the region at hand. In short, for effective learning we think that there has to be a large degree of 
compatibility between the donor and host region. In particular, a strong congruence between territories 
in terms of their economic and institutional structure is needed. As we see it, what applies for regions 
in general, applies even more for ‘best practice’ areas: the particular structural and cultural tissue 
found in these regions renders their area-based policies in fact a unique flavour that cannot be 
transferred easily to other places. It is for these structure- and culture-based contingencies that the 
literature on comparative public policy warns: regions may draw inspiration from Silicon Valley, but 
simply cannot turn themselves in a second one. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion: don’t imitate - innovate 
 
In these days, the EU explicitly promotes the dissemination of so-called ‘best practices’ in regional 
innovation policy. With the help of score boards, case studies of successful regions, interregional 
benchmarks European regions are encouraged to raise their competitiveness. In practice, however, 
this trend of territorial benchmarking has led to the imitation of a limited number of alleged success 
stories like Silicon Valley. Regions marketing themselves as Silicon Glen (Scotland), Language Valley 
(Flanders) and Dommel Valley (Eindhoven) point to the dreams many areas have to turn themselves 
into the next ‘Silicon Somewhere’. In the present paper, we tried to assess the usefulness of such 
‘best practices’ in EU regional innovation policy and to find what lessons really can be drawn from 
regional success stories. For this purpose, we used insights from Schumpeter and the literature on 
economic geography and comparative public policy studies. From a Schumpeterian view, the copycat 
behaviour among authorities suggests the existence of a political ‘business cycle’: politicians are just 
like entrepreneurs in that they tend to imitate a first mover in the hope to share in its success – but as 
more imitators enter the scene, the profit opportunities of the innovative policy fade away and a shake 
out is likely to set in. The economic-geographical body of literature offers us some concepts (e.g. 
clusters, industrial districts, innovative milieux and learning regions) that stress the importance for a 
region to build upon unique, place-based conditions in order to gain competitive advantage. After all, 
real competitiveness always is about being different. Finally, the branch of comparative public policy 
studies points to the ‘contingencies of lesson-drawing’, i.e. the preconditions that affect whether a 
policy measure can be transferred from one place to another. Notably the contingencies related to the 
degree of uniqueness of an area’s structure and culture may hamper the possibility of ‘learning by 
comparing’. If we combine the three bodies of literature, we may conclude that the possibilities of 
lesson-drawing from ‘best practices’ in regional innovation policy is only limited. Even more, the very 
conditions that explain the success of a particular region will be the most difficult elements to learn 
from. By relying too heavily upon them, we fear, areas may undermine their competitive advantage 
and become victims of a territorial ‘race to the bottom’.  
 What does this rather pessimistic conclusion imply for the contents and organization of EU 
regional innovation policy? In our view, the most important recommendation for European policy 
makers is this: try to stimulate authorities to develop as much as possible strategies that are based on 
an assessment of the region’s specific characteristics instead of dreaming to copy successful 
programmes from abroad. In our view, the starting-point for an effective area-based policy has to be 
found in the existing structure and culture of the regional economy. In that respect, regional ‘best 
practices’ should be seen as inspiration sources rather than as recipes for successful regional 
economic development. Within the structural and cultural specificities of a region governments may try 
to identify activities with opportunities for innovation and growth. We think that opportunities for that 
can be found in - paraphrasing Schumpeter’s (1912) term for innovations - ‘new combinations’ of local 
traditions and global trends. To be sure, this integration of new into old is quite a job and requires 
much creativity. At first glance, it is hard to conceive how heroes of the old economy could fulfil a new 
role in the future. However, there is room for policy learning in this field – without, of course, the 
possibility of copying the success of these regions, a warning that we want to repeat again and again. 
In Europe several regions can be found that show how regional policy may bridge the gap between 
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local traditions and global trends. In some cases authorities have rejuvenated traditional local activities 
by fostering the introduction of high-technology in these sectors’ production and marketing. Without an 
locally attuned regional policy such new combinations probably would not have been realised in the 
Italian leather and textiles industry and the Swiss watch making industry (Swatch). The same goes for 
the upgrading of Finnish forestry from the 1990s on, which has resulted in new fields of application like 
bio-and e-forestry. Other examples illustrate how the expertise of a declining sector may be exploited 
for new activities. In Landskrona (Sweden), for instance, the state helped employees in shipbuilding to 
start their own business within the shipyard. Here, new firms emerged in which the workers used their 
knowledge and skills in shipbuilding for the production of machine spare parts. Likewise, the 
emergence of the golf equipment industry in San Diego (United States) and the Britpop music cluster 
in Manchester (England) can be traced back to the prior existence of industries whose know-how on 
advanced materials proved to be useful for new playing tools. In some cases old industries also have 
taken advantage of the trend that demand for services is rising. In the former industrial area around 
Lille (France) several textile factories have been transformed effectively to mail order firms in the field 
of clothing. In the German Ruhr Area traditional sectors have changed of use as well. Since the 1990s 
local authorities are promoting the region’s industrial tradition actively in the tourism branch. More and 
more tourists are visiting the area now in order to discover its ‘industrial culture’. This original policy 
has contributed to the successful structural change in the Ruhr Area over the last years. In short, there 
will be a lot of interesting possibilities for government to realise place-specific ‘new combinations’ by 
means of regional innovation policy.  
 It should be stressed that the above examples of an alternative innovation policy directed at global-
local interfaces in a regional setting should be viewed as nothing more than sources of inspiration. The 
examples of this type of policy are not ‘best practices’ but ‘unique practices’ in that they demonstrate 
that an approach aimed at regional uniqueness rather than regional ubiquities is the most feasible way 
to proceed. And if policy makers want to draw any inspiration from other regions, we advise them 
rather to look for what we would like to call regional ‘worst practices’. After all, we often learn more 
from failures than from successes. Thus, we feel that studying examples that were unsuccessful might 
be more productive in terms of possibilities for lesson drawing. Earlier in this paper (section 3) we 
mentioned already the danger of a region becoming an area that hosts a ‘cathedral in the desert’ 
without any connection to the local environment. This lack of embeddedness is a serious pitfall of 
regional innovation policy aimed at the next ‘Silicon Somewhere’. From this perspective, it makes 
sense to look at failures of regional policy – Akademgorodok in Siberia and Sardinia in Italy’s South 
being extreme examples. In short, we propagate a kind of ‘regional Realpolitik’ in Europe: policy 
makers should stimulate and search for what is feasible in the present local context rather than what 
they deem desirable. In this strategy of ‘regional realism’, regional ‘best practices’ such as Silicon 
Valley may only provide some inspiration for public authorities; they are by no means recipes for 
successful regional development.  
 Therefore, we advise European policymakers to take care with the further propagation of 
benchmarking in regional innovation policy. Only when local authorities are stimulated to attune their 
policies to area-specific assets as much as possible, a European ‘race to the bottom’ may be 
prevented. On a more concrete level, a European policy of ‘regional realism’ might ask for more 
decentralization and localization than the current EU policy practice of just dividing funds among 
Europe’s regions. The regional ‘new combinations’-policy we have in mind can be best left to the sub-
national (local) level: here we can find the ‘genius of place’ the best opportunities for local 
empowerment. At the same time, we think, a higher-level government should see to it that the imitative 
tendencies of policy makers do not induce a European-wide ‘race to the bottom’. In the case of EU 
policy, this mainly localized ‘new combinations’-approach can be introduced within the scope of the 
subsidiarity principle. In concrete terms, it might be worth considering the adoption of an article in the 
Treaty stating that the Commission shall take care for enough ‘policy diversity’ among areas on a 
European-wide scale. By adopting such a practice of ‘regional realism’, we think, there is hope for real 
renewal for the benefit of Europe as a whole. In short: don’t imitate – innovate! 
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